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OF SWEATSHOPS AND SUBSISTENCE: HABERMAS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that the discourse theoretic account of human rights
defended by Jürgen Habermas contains a fruitful tension that is obscured by its dominant
tendency to identify rights with legal claims. This weakness in Habermas’s account
becomes manifest when we examine how sweatshops diminish the secure enjoyment of
subsistence, which Habermas himself (in recognition of the UDHR) recognizes as a
human right. Discourse theories of human rights are unique in tying the legitimacy of
human rights to democratic deliberation and consensus. So construed, their specific
meaning and force is the outcome of historical political struggle. However, unlike other
legal rights, they possess universal moral validity. In this paper I argue that this tension
between the legal and moral aspects of human rights can be resolved if and only if human
rights are conceived as moral aspirations and not simply as legal claims. In particular, I
shall argue that there are two reasons why human rights must be understood as moral
aspirations that function non-juridically: First, the basic human goods to which human
rights provide secure access are determinable only in relation to basic human capabilities
that are progressively revealed in the course of an indefinite (fully inclusive and
universal) process of collective learning; second, the institutional impediments to
enjoying human rights are cultural in nature and cannot be remedied by means of legal
coercion.

Discourse theory (DT) distinguishes itself from other moral and legal theories by the
priority it places on group deliberation as the source of rights and duties. Like other social
contract theories, it insists that no norm (law) be imposed on persons without their
rational consent. However, unlike Hobbesian theory, it also insists that the rationality of
the consent given be impartial (oriented toward advancing the interests of each and
everyone who is affected by the norm equally, free from the effects of power); unlike
Kantian (Rawlsian) theory, it further insists that impartial consent be the outcome of real
dialogue and not a hypothetical thought experiment.
Taken together, the impartiality and democracy conditions generate a fruitful
tension. As a moral ideal (aspiration), impartiality is at best approximated in collective
deliberation. The legitimacy of any agreed-upon norm is therefore at best provisional,
subject to revocation in light of retrospective knowledge of constraints, inequalities, and

exclusions. When the norm in question purports to regulate the lives of every person qua
human being – as human rights ostensibly do – then the process of collective deliberation
is stretched to the limit. It becomes an indefinite learning process in which the meaning
of basic human capabilities (and the goods that realize them) are progressively and
comprehensively (viz., reflectively) brought to consciousness.
So construed, human rights designate goals or standards against which we judge
shortfalls that any fully civilized society ought to provide its citizens. This exclusively
moral understanding of human rights thus designates an aspiration, as the Preamble to
the UDHR puts it, that is urged upon all of us to realize at some unspecified time in the
future, without regard to our citizenship or official status. In turn, the duties and
responsibilities that flow from this aspiration emerge in the course of a global dialog
concerning our own human capabilities and society’s failure to develop them equally and
inclusively. In the words of Habermas, human rights “function . . . as sensors for
exclusionary practices exercised in their name.”1
By contrast, when considered as a decision-procedure for resolving normative
conflicts here and now – and not as a process of enlightenment – DT inclines toward a
different understanding of human rights. This is evident in Habermas’s assertion that
human rights designate legal claims: “Liberal (in the narrower sense) basic rights make
up the core of human rights declarations,” and so “acquire the additional meaning of
liberal rights against the state held by private legal subjects.”2 The fact that human rights
are claims against juridical institutions is further underscored by Habermas when he
asserts that “the discourse of human rights is also set up to provide every voice with a

hearing,” presumably in a court of law under the supervision of either a constitutional
state or a constitutional international body (or both).
I shall argue that Habermas fails to fully appreciate the implication his two-track
model of democracy (as moral learning process and juridical decision procedure) has for
a theory of human rights. By focusing almost exclusively on the juridical notion of
human rights as legal claims – and virtually ignoring the moral notion of human rights as
aspirations – he cannot fully capture what is most distinctive about a DT theory of human
rights, namely the progressive genesis of human rights in a collective process of
enlightenment.

My argument is divided into six parts. The first part explains why Habermas is
exclusively drawn to a juridical understanding of human rights. I maintain that none of
the practical and logico-functional considerations that compel him in this direction, which
invariably concern the need for a decision procedure in resolving conflicts, individually
or collectively, speak against a complementary DT understanding of human rights as
moral aspirations. The second part presents a challenge to a juridical conception of
human rights. Sweatshops that operate within the laws of global capitalist economy
invariably threaten the subsistence of workers. However, as I argue in part three,
Habermas’s juridical conception of human rights can only grasp subsistence as
instrumental toward exercising those human rights that are logically and functionally
embedded in modern law. In so doing, it denies a human right to subsistence, understood
as a relatively unconditional moral good on par with and complementary to other goods
secured by human rights. Furthermore, a juridical conception of rights is relatively

impotent in remedying the cultural causes that contribute to the insecure enjoyment of
subsistence within a patriarchal sweatshop culture. The fourth part of my argument
reconstructs a more adequate defense of a human right to subsistence drawing from
Habermas’s own account of the complementarity of moral rights and duties. The fifth
part extends this defense further by grounding human rights claims in a theory of human
capabilities, which serves to clarify the aspirational sense of human rights. I here defend
the philosophical cogency of a theory of human capabilities against familiar Habermasian
objections against substantive (non-procedural) moral philosophies. I conclude my
argument by showing how DT clarifies the range of negative and positive duties that bear
on securing subsistence rights for sweatshop workers, including the duty of workers to
emancipate themselves from patriarchal and caste institutions through discursive
enlightenment.

Habermas on Human Rights: A General Overview
Most philosophers have held that rights are claims of one kind or another.
Habermas is no exception. This preference is understandable given the gravity we
customarily accord to rights as singling out our most important duties to act (or forbear
from acting) in certain ways. Although there is much debate about whether all rights
entail duties or whether rights are best understood as interests or aspirations, one thing is
clear. An aspiration toward a good does not specify an agent responsible (duty-bound) to
bring about that good. Thus, although many rights listed among the articles of the UDHR
are best described as only aspirations (such as the right to leisure), the rights that have

been enforced through international peacekeeping intervention have been treated as legal
claims which subjects have against governments and powerful leaders.
Habermas’s deep appreciation for the necessity of a global human rights regime
reflects this understanding as well. In the quotation cited earlier he designates “liberal
rights” – or rights to freedom (of movement, of property ownership, of speech and
association, etc.) - as the core human rights. These “negative rights” – or permissions to
act without interference – are claims that are directed against governments. The most
important institutions Habermas singles out in enforcing these rights - international courts
of law (such as the ICC) and international peacekeeping bodies (the UN Security
Council) – are instituted precisely to uphold these rights against severe and widespread
“violations.”
Here, then, is Habermas’s main reason for holding that human rights are legal
rights. The liberal rights that constitute the core of human rights as Habermas understands
it are conceptually and functionally embedded in modern law and their enforcement is so
crucial to the very existence of society that it cannot remain contingent on the caprice of
private “moral” conscience. As a related matter, human rights that are only moral rights
suffer from the defects of a “state of nature”: their precise meaning, individual
application (adjudication) and coercive enforcement are uncertain and subject to the
kinds of political opportunism (witness the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq) that critics of
human rights, such as Carl Schmitt, are quick to seize upon. Without a legal decision
procedure to resolve conflicting interpretations, judgments, and actions, the discourse of
human rights quickly degenerates into an abyss of endless disputation.

Finally, given the need to legitimate specific human rights interpretations,
judgments, and enforcements, legal certainty is not enough. DT insists that these
“decisions” must have the support of a universal consensus. Ideally, a global public
sphere would persuade the leaders of nations and international law-enforcement bodies to
interpret and implement human rights in accord with evolving public opinion.
We can argue the details of Habermas’s vision but probably most of us would
agree that a global human rights regime that would interpret, apply, and enforce
juridically conceived “liberal” human rights is highly desirable for the reasons he
mentions. At the same time, it is important to note that, for Habermas, a juridical
understanding of human rights is not free-standing of moral argumentation in the way
that Rawls and some other prominent theorists have argued. Human rights, he notes, are
Janus-faced: they are legal rights that are grounded not in the political values, ends, and
policies of a particular people but in universal morality.
That said, it remains unclear whether, according to Habermas, human rights are
moral rights that embody aspirations. Habermas’s endorsement of Dworkin’s
understanding of law as “interpretation” suggests an affirmative response to this query
BFN: 197ff). According to Dworkin, the meaning of any concrete legal right (rule) is
always circumscribed by a coherent body of abstract moral principles. Incorporating this
interpretative account of law into his own DT, Habermas underscores the “revolutionary”
nature of constitutional law as an indefinite project of dialogical reflection. Democratic
public opinion “interprets” the moral content of its own legal presuppositions. This
content in turn circulates through parliamentary and judicial bodies, where further
discussion sharpens its statutory meaning and force. The progressive inclusion and

emancipation of legal subjects through the extension of rights increasingly expands and
enriches the scope of democratic public opinion, thereby leading to a new cycle of moral
enlightenment and political reform.
Habermas’s understanding of human rights as “sensors” for exclusion, which I
cited above, recalls this dialectic. Therefore, arguing on the basis of Habermas’s
discourse theoretical account of constitutional law (which he extends to cosmopolitan
human rights law), it is not implausible to hold that human rights also designate moral
aspirations. In any case, an understanding of human rights as aspirations does not
obviously conflict with an understanding of human rights as claims.

A Weakness in the Juridical Understanding of Human Rights: Structural
Human Rights Abuses

The question now before us is whether a juridical understanding of human rights
can undergird human rights – specifically second- and third-generation rights - that fall
outside of the classical liberal model. Take the human right to subsistence. Assuming that
such a human right exists and can be philosophically defended, it is far from obvious that
it can also be explained juridically. As we shall see, this right is not as integral to modern
law as liberal rights are. Nor can shortfalls in its secure enjoyment be as easily described
as “violations” of laws (domestic or international) that have been perpetrated by
governments and their proxies who are subject to punitive sanction.

The example of sweatshops illustrates how the right to subsistence can be
diminished - without being violated - by impersonal economic and cultural structures for
whom no discretely identifiable agent can be held responsible. In the case of sweatshops,
we can distinguish between several layers of legal rights violations. First, there are
violations of workers' domestic rights directly caused by employer disregard for
minimum wage, workplace safety, and collective bargaining laws. Second, there are
violations of workers’ human rights caused by government officials and their proxies in
deliberately allowing – or in extreme cases, mandating – these violations, at least insofar
as these contravene international human rights conventions.
However, in addition to these legal violations we detect other causes contributing
to a shortfall in sweatshop workers’ secure enjoyment of subsistence. Some of these
emanate from the lawful, normal operations of a market economy in which sweatshops
are forced to operate on a precariously thin margin of profitability in order to meet the
demands of multinational retailers and their affluent clients. The chain of sweatshop
production often ends in a household where a family sub-contractor (the family patriarch)
is legally defined as self-employed – outside the framework of legal protections. Here the
distinction between employer and employed is totally effaced; the patriarch functions as
the boss who oversees his wife and children. Working at the margin – or at solvency
(minimum subsistence) – the patriarch dominates and exploits his family, even as he is
dominated and exploited by those who subcontract his “labor.” In a context where
collective bargaining does not apply, traditional gender roles function to maintain labor
discipline. So here we encounter yet another institutional impediment to securing
women’s right to subsistence.

This example perfectly illustrates two weaknesses of a juridical understanding of
human rights: its tendency to emphasize what Thomas Pogge calls an “interactional”
conception of human rights which cannot easily accommodate impersonal institutional
impediments to the secure enjoyment of rights; and its corresponding embrace of a
“liability” model of responsibility that focuses on punishment and compensation
(distributive justice) rather than on political reform aimed at eliminating class and gender
domination.

The interactional conception of human rights undoubtedly captures a significant
class of human rights violations. The most visible human rights violations, involving
genocide, ethnic cleansing, political repression of parties and collective bargaining
agents, and so on, are perpetrated by governments and their unofficial proxies (such as
civilian militias). These violations arise from person-to-person interactions that have
been commanded (or permitted) from on high. The victims here have uncontestable
claims against individual leaders whom they hold liable for depriving them of a basic
liberty. So blatant and extreme is their suffering and servitude that we ourselves feel a
deep solidarity with them. This “negative” solidarity, Habermas points out, is not
similarly extended to the world’s poor, for whom we feel a “positive” but weaker
solidarity.3 For this reason, he endorses aggressive international “policing” intervention
in grievous cases of violent repression but not in cases of poverty, whose remedies, he
feels, fall within the province of a “global domestic policy” based on voluntary
multilateral treaties.
Notice, too, that the interactional understanding of human rights assigns
responsibility for human rights violations according to personal liability. This model

defines harms as deviations from a normal background of conventionally sanctioned
hazards that are causally traceable to the discrete actions of individual wrongdoers. The
proper juridical reaction to holding someone personally liable for an overt crime is police
intervention aimed at stopping the crime and apprehension, processing, and punishment
of the perpetrator. Along with compensating the victim for her suffering, these remedies
aim at restoring the status quo ante.
When we turn to the sweatshop example, we notice that the interactional/liability
model only captures one aspect of a complex human rights shortfall. Following Henry
Shue, let us provisionally describe a human right as a reasonable demand (claim or
expectation) that others provide (reasonable) socially guaranteed protection against
standard threats on one’s self-esteem as a human being. In the patriarchal sweatshop, we
see that government toleration of what at times amounts to forced confinement and labor
(slavery) certainly fails to protect against a standard threat to one’s self-esteem as a
human being. Here the interactional/liability model of human rights seems appropriate. It
is not appropriate, however, when addressing the threats posed to the subsistence,
freedom, and self-esteem of women workers caused by the structural workings of a
capitalist economy, whose law of competition forces a constant depression of wages to
which only the most desperate submit. Add to this a patriarchal structure of domination
that keeps women in slave-like servitude – partly with their own complicity – and we see
that the standard threat to one’s self-esteem as a human being is also cultural and
ideological.
The structural impediment to the reasonably secure enjoyment of a human right to
subsistence implicates a complex web of global causes that are only partly explicable in

terms of personal interaction and liability. True, one might hold liable the citizens who
elect the leaders who appoint the bureaucrats who underwrite the multilateral treaties that
maintain unjust trade, lending, and resource extraction agreements. But who does one
hold responsible for capitalism and patriarchal culture? These latter institutions arise
from the unintended, aggregate effects of many actions extended over many centuries.
Although their source is impersonal, their effect is not, for these structures create unequal
opportunities for developing and exercising human capabilities between differently
positioned groups of persons.4
I will later argue that the presence of unequal opportunities for developing and
exercising human capabilities between differently positioned groups of persons can rise
to the level of a severe human rights abuse. It suffices to note that what Iris Young calls
the “social connectedness” of many differently positioned persons in contributing
(however unwittingly) to the maintenance of otherwise legal, human-rights abusing
economic and cultural structures calls for a non-juridical response. To begin with, the
abuse in question often seldom rises to the level of a clear violation. Nevertheless, even
when women are allowed a modicum of freedom and subsistence within the patriarchal
sweatshop, so that there is no clear violation of their right to liberty and subsistence, we
can hardly conclude that others have reasonably protected them against the standard
likelihood that their liberty and subsistence will be threatened in the future. The degree of
abuse is always relative and protection against it never perfectly secured. Furthermore,
the source of the abuse is not always susceptible to a legal remedy. It may be that massive
legal reform is both necessary and sufficient to remedy the abusive injustices of a
capitalist economy. However, it is unlikely that the same could be said of the abusive

injustices of patriarchal culture. Changing culturally ingrained gender roles and
misogynist ideologies in a way that might empower women to fight for improved
working conditions has been at best only partly affected in places where it was legally
mandated. The real source for change must emerge from within a grass-roots struggle
over the meaning of culture itself, specifically regarding the basic capabilities whose
equal development everyone is entitled to. [disabilities?]

The Juridical Roots of a Human Right to Subsistence in Habermas’s DT

Is there a resource within Habermas’s DT that can be drawn from to justify a human right
to subsistence? One would think so. Habermas himself recognizes that the right to
subsistence is a human right, and there are important places where he develops what
Thomas Pogge refers to as an “institutional” alternative to the interactional understanding
of human rights that implicates legal institutions (specifically multilateral trade
agreements) in maintaining economic structures that contribute to poverty. For instance,
despite his insistence that liberal rights that protect negative liberty form the core of
human rights, Habermas condemns neo-liberal human rights regimes that restrict human
rights to “negative liberties of citizens who acquire an 'immediate' status vis-a-vis the
global economy.”5 Combined with his scathing indictment of global poverty and
inequality, this condemnation compels him to acknowledge a right to subsistence. Indeed,
in addition to endorsing the UDHR, he expressly mentions as basic “rights to the

provision of living conditions that are socially, technologically, and ecologically
safeguarded”.6
But a problem now arises with regard to justifying this human right. Unlike
Rawls, Habermas does not think that the mere presumption of an overlapping consensus
among the world’s peoples regarding a thin list of human rights suffices to secure them
the proper respect they merit. A philosophical justification is necessary. Classical liberal
and political rights, he believes, have such a justification without having to stray outside
the a priori procedural categories specified by DT. Social rights, by contrast, do not, and
are at best contingent and derivative of classical liberal and political rights:

From a normative standpoint, according “priority” to social and cultural rights
basic rights does not make sense for the simple reason that such rights only serve
to secure the “fair value” [as Rawls puts it] of liberal and political basic rights,
that is, the factual presuppositions for the equal opportunity to exercise individual
rights.7

Social and cultural rights, then, do not have the same status as liberal and political rights.
At best, the right to demand protection against standard threats to material well-being is a
right that persons living within liberal and democratic orders can demand of their society
to the extent that it is regarded as a necessary condition for achieving civic equality.
Another way of putting the matter is to say that social and cultural rights more
conditional than civil and political rights. Whereas the latter are necessary for possessing
a minimal degree of legal status, the latter are not. Furthermore, given that Habermas

understands cosmopolitan human rights law in terms of an extension of constitutional law
in which liberal and political rights are unconditional, we can understand these rights as
unconditional human rights. By contrast, the right to subsistence as it is presented here is
not justified intrinsically, as an unconditionally universal human right, but
instrumentally, as a subsidiary right that might be dispensed with without jeopardizing
basic self-esteem.
The justification of the equally unconditional and universal status of liberal and
political rights is worked out by Habermas at several levels: The first level involves a
philosophical deduction of basic categories of rights derived from the functional concept
of modern law and the normative idea of rational justification. The second level involves
the political process of realizing (or interpreting) these abstract principles of right in
terms of constitutional rights – the site where liberal and political rights first make their
appearance. The third level involves the process of statutory legislation, adjudication, and
executive enforcement – the site where liberal and political rights are statutorily defined
and their opportunity for equal exercise made possible through the provision of social
rights.
Habermas begins by deducing three categories of basic rights that are essential to
any modern legal code. The distinctive thing about this deduction is its procedural nature.
Instead of appealing to substantive arguments about basic needs and capabilities that
ought to be protected by right, Habermas appeals only to the formal concept of modern
law and the formal concept of discursive justification. First, in modern legal systems
rights must take the form of individual liberties – insofar as this form is a functional
prerequisite for market societies. Neither the bare concept of an individual liberty (or

permission to act free from interference) nor the historical record of its actual
implementation shows that individual liberties must be held equally by all citizens. The
normative principle that all citizens must be treated as “equals under the law” - which is
crucial to the modern concept of human rights - enters law from outside. According to
Habermas, natural law attempts to trace this equality back to universal morality are
mistaken, since the content of morality cannot be revealed through personal introspection
but only through discursive justification. Hence the concept of equal treatment must be
located outside of morality as well, in a more general set of norms that inform the
principle of rational discourse (D) that underlies everyday communicative action
coordinated by rationally-redeemable validity claims. (D) asserts that “just those action
norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in
rational discourse” (BFN: 107). This principle holds that valid norms must be universally
acceptable as being in the equal interest of each and everyone, following fair, free, and
inclusive discussion. Applied to legal rights, (D) functions as a premise from which the
following rights categories can be derived (in descending order of necessity):

I. Subjective rights (permissions) to act freely, without constraint
II. Citizenship rights to political membership
III. Rights to have one's rights adjudicated according to due process
IV. Political rights to participate in legislating rights
V. Social rights to the background conditions requisite for effectively exercising

I-IV.

Categories I-IV possess and unconditional conceptual necessity that Habermas
characterizes as “ equiprimordial.” Applied to the modern concept of a legal right, (D)
immediately yields the first and most basic category of subjective rights: equal (negative)
rights to individual liberty, or non-interference in the pursuit of self-chosen ends.
The second category of citizenship rights follows conceptually from the fact that liberty
rights are claims recognized by a legal community. When combined with liberty rights,
citizenship rights entail a human right to change one's citizenship status through
emigration. The third category of due process rights follows conceptually from the fact
that legal rights are claims that can be adjudicated and enforced through recognizable
legal processes.
Taken together, rights to liberty, citizenship, and due process constitute what we
mean by a valid legal code. Generated monologically (i.e., by conceptual analysis) the
legal code comprises only a set of abstract principles or “unsaturated placeholders” for
rights. In order to get a substantively prescriptive bill of rights, members of a
constitutional convention need to apply this code to their own political deliberation. Here
the principle of discourse (D) is applied a second time. Whereas it had been used to
derive the bare category of an equal, actionable legal right, it is now used to derive
legitimate (binding) rights; viz., both the scope and binding force of rights must be
conceived as being the outcome of democratic legislation. Although the categorical
scheme of rights that limits democracy from the outside is deduced authoritatively from

the bare concept of law and equal citizenship, its concrete interpretation and elaboration
in the form of a system of prescriptive permissive rights must be adduced democratically.
This entails a fourth category of political rights. Herein lies the basis for human rights to
speak out, associate, and publish, all of which can be interpreted as negative rights, as
well as positive rights to run for public office, elect leaders of one's choice, and vote in
elections. Thus there exists, as Habermas puts it, an “internal relation between human
rights and popular sovereignty” (BFN: 123).
Finally, because rights I-IV cannot be effectively and equally exercised by
persons who suffer from extreme need or insecurity, Habermas adduces as a fifth
category of rights equal rights to the opportunities and resources necessary for exercising
rights I-IV, including “basic rights to the provision of living conditions that are socially,
technologically, and ecologically safeguarded” (BFN: 123). Importantly, whereas
Habermas insists that the first four categories of right are “justified absolutely” in relation
to the concept of modern law and as such must be entrenched in constitutional law, he
observes that the last category of welfare rights – under which we might include
subsistence – is justified only “relatively” and contingently. As we shall see below, this
claim will turn out to be problematic to the extent that Habermas regards human rights as
extensions of constitutional rights.
Some constitutional rights – namely those that correspond to equal civil and
political rights (equal freedom of speech and equal freedom to participate in political
deliberation and decision) are conceptually (logically and necessarily) implied in the
constitutive rules of democratic practice, understood as a procedure of rational
discussion. Other constitutional rights - to private property, personal security, freedom of

movement, and indeed all the classical liberal rights that originally occupied the attention
of Locke and other liberal social contract theorists during the age of monarchy, are more
directly related to the “grammar of the legal code” (PC, 117-18). These classical human
rights, Habermas tells us, do not “have [their] origins in morality, but rather bear the
imprint of individual liberties, hence of a specifically juridical concept”8 More precisely,
although such rights appear to be moral rights because of their universal validity, this is
only apparently so. This is not to deny that classical human rights are justified by moral
arguments. But these arguments are unique in having an institutional referent. Whereas
moral arguments typically appeal to the respect owed to persons in light of their
humanity, or human capabilities and needs, arguments in support of classical liberal
rights arise in direct response to violations of a juridical nature that emanate from the
state (BFN: 191). Hence, unlike moral rights, which entail corresponding duties, liberal
human rights function as permissions (negative freedoms) to act without fear of
government constraint. The positive freedoms (entitlements) that can be derived from
them take the form of citizenship and due process rights. Likewise, the duty to secure
these freedoms falls exclusively on governments (BFN: 174).
Here we see how the procedural deduction of basic constitutional rights (the
paradigm instances of what will later be known as human rights) biases Habermas’s
understanding of the human right to subsistence. The right to subsistence, if it exists at
all, need not (and normally does not) find constitutional support. What finds
constitutional support is a liberal right (permission) to acquire and exchange property,
free from arbitrary governmental interference. Constitutionally speaking, the government
has a duty to protect the political, civil, and property (and contractual) rights that

comprise the first principle of justice in Rawls’s and Habermas’s scheme. The priority
accorded liberty stands in marked contrast to the secondary status accorded social
welfare. The just distribution of material resources and opportunities requisite for the full
and equal exercise of liberal rights is not constitutionally guaranteed, and its satisfaction
cannot be permitted if it diminishes civil and political liberty overall (viz., while tradeoffs
between liberties are permitted, tradeoffs between liberty and welfare are not). Only after
the most extensive liberty compatible with equal rights for all has been legally guaranteed
can government then begin to satisfy the “fair value” of civil and political liberty by
adopting redistributive policies that improve the worst-off without harming the better off
(Rawls’s Difference Principle). So satisfying the subsistence needs of citizens “fairly” is
at best a duty that the government acquires contingently, as a result of legislators and
citizens voluntarily deciding to incorporate this right into statutory legislation.
What is disturbing here is not the fact that social rights, unlike civil and political
rights, might not be legally guaranteed in a liberal democracy (although both Rawls and
Habermas insist that a liberal democracy without a government-backed social “safety
net” is morally unreasonable). My example of the sweatshop shows that some of the
cultural factors influencing the secure enjoyment of subsistence probably cannot be
legislated. Rather, what is disturbing is that the right to subsistence as it is here
presented, within a juridical derivation of rights, cannot be treated as a basic (viz.,
unconditional) human right on par with other human rights to civil, political, and
economic freedom. Poverty deaths caused by the lawful (constitutionally legitimate)
workings of an unjust global economic order will not count as human rights violations,
but as regrettable (if avoidable) tragedies that can at best be reduced through acts of

charitable assistance and developmental aid that are by no means obligatory as a matter
of human right. While utilitarians might have good reason to argue that our duties to
assist others are as strong as our duties to not harm them (even requiring the selfimposition of burdens comparable to those who are the least well off) others, preferring a
more libertarian approach, will demur so that the radical political reform necessary for
changing abusive structures will be replaced by superficial palliative efforts at
redistribution.
To summarize: Following Habermas’s derivation of rights, the right to
subsistence is justified instrumentally. Its function is to provide opportunities for the
equal exercise of constitutionally guaranteed civil, political, and economic liberties, not
the secure protection of intrinsic goods. Second, the right to subsistence, as a statutory
right, exists only as a legal right that is claimed against legal institutions. It is not a claim
against oppressive economic structures or traditional systems of patriarchy and racial
caste that have been imposed on the poor by the cumulative aggregation of unintended
consequences extending backwards in time over many generations. Not only may such
structures and systems thrive within modern legal institutions, but efforts to legally
reform them may be ineffectual. Third, the right to subsistence, qua legal right, is
contingent. In an affluent society in which wealth is already evenly distributed, such a
legal right would be unnecessary. Fourth and finally, the right to subsistence is
understood as implying a positive governmental duty to redistribute opportunites and
resources, contingent on citizens’ sympathetic identification with their worst-off
compatriots. As such, its enforcement cannot be subsumed under the central control of a

global human rights agency, whose contributing members are not linked in democratic
solidarity.

The Complementarity of Human Rights in Habermas’s DT

There are resources within Habermas’s theory of rights that justify a human right to
subsistence, two of which we have already noted: (1) an institutional account of human
rights that sees human rights as claims against freedom- denying structures that have
been imposed on persons without their free, rational consent and (2) an account of basic
rights, including a classical liberal right to property but not excluding “rights to life and
bodily integrity” (PC: 125, that have “intrinsic value” apart from “their instrumental
value for democratic will formation.” A third resource is his DT account of the
complementarity of moral rights and duties, which would seem to imply that the right to
subsistence is equiprimordial with respect to other human rights.
In his treatment of moral rights in Justification and Application, Habermas argues
that rights that protect negative freedom (absence of restraint) do not possess priority
over rights that protect positive freedom (capability and empowerment). To act freely
involves the mental capacity to think and the physical capacity to move as well as the
unrestricted space in which to do both. Hence a negative right not to be mentally or
physically harmed (to be free from harmful interference) is meaningless unless
accompanied by a positive right to mental and physical life: the free agency of a child is
diminished as much by the denial of love and affection, discipline and education, as it is
by the unwanted intrusion of verbal and physical assaults.

Despite this complementarity, deontological moral theory since Kant has
traditionally privileged negative rights and duties over positive rights and duties.9 Some
of the reasons for doing so -- that only the former are unconditionally valid, determinate
in content, and unambiguous in address -- prove unconvincing. 10 This impression is
reinforced once we follow Habermas in defining freedom in terms of capabilities of selfunderstanding, reasoning, and moral reflection that are not innate but only emerge within
a communicative (and dialogical) process of socialization. The integrity of the
autonomous, self-empowering individual is dependent upon the integrity of a caring,
solidaristic community wherein her freedom and personality are socially affirmed and
recognized. Freedom and dependency, integrity and vulnerability, individuality and
sociality are thus dialectically linked.
If we bear in mind that legal institutions function, in part, to efficiently discharge
our most important moral duties, then the link between negative and positive rights can
be used to generate a moral account of human rights in which the right to subsistence
complements rights to security, liberty, and political empowerment. Although neither
category of right can claim priority over the others, particular kinds of rights within any
give category can claim priority over other kinds within that category. Within the broad
category of subsistence rights the right to resources necessary for life is more basic than
(and hence prior to) the right to own private property and productive assets. When
property rights conflict with survival rights, the conflict must be resolved in favor of the
latter. Indeed, the right to privately own and exchange “productive assets” might also
conflict with rights listed under a different category, such as political empowerment. The
right of private investors (owners of stock) to run enterprises through managers they elect

is arguably less prior than the right of laborers (and of the broader community who also
has a stake in the enterprise) to democratically regulate their own labor and therewith the
development of their productive capacities and powers. In general, the most important
rights revolve around securing conditions of agency structured by communicative
reciprocity and solidarity. For this reason, classical liberal property rights are not morally
prior to basic subsistence rights, even if they are more basic from the standpoint of
constitutional law (JA: 66).11

Human Rights, Human Capabilities, and Human Aspirations

Unlike a classical right to property, which is clearly a legal construction, the right
to life is essentially a moral idea. Its ground precedes the legal system and is nothing
other than the most basic capability, need, and interest that humans possess as a part of
their universal nature. Invoking universal human nature as a set of universal need,
interests, and capabilities, however, immediately calls to mind the kind of moral realism
(and moral intuitionism) that Habermas has labeled “metaphysical” (and pre-rational) and
therefore in opposition to the Kantian democratic procedural idea of self-determination.12
Of course, there is no reason why we can’t think of human nature nonmetaphysically, as capabilities and functions that evolve contingently, in response to our
evolving self-understanding as a species, and that are known empirically (revealed and
constituted conversationally). But there may be another reason why Habermas resists
linking human rights discourse to the moral discourse of needs and capabilities. Viewing
human rights in this manner also forces us to think of them in expressly non-juridical

terms. The fact that capabilities, interests, and needs imply indeterminate conditions for
their actualization suggests that the concrete meaning of human rights is not exhausted by
their minimalist claim structure. Human rights qua moral rights remain essentially and
interminably disputable – a project of discursive learning that is ill-equipped to function
as a consensual decision procedure for resolving disputes generated by its own moral
indeterminacy. Because the moral consensus that grounds human rights is ideal and
counterfactual (forever deferred), they function as ideal aspirations, or evolving
standards of civilization, progress, and critique, quite apart from (and even in tension
with) their status as legal claims to a minimally decent threshold of decent treatment.13
As I noted earlier, Habermas himself regards the tension between morality and
legality as a productive; a bi-level model of democratic discourse in which the fruitful
interplay between formal decision-making (conflict resolution) and informal deliberation
(learning) ostensibly explains how constitutional projects acquire greater legitimacy in
the course of comprehensively realizing moral aspirations. However, in the absence of a
global constitutional basis for cosmopolitan human rights law, it may be that
acknowledging the philosophical moral rationale underlying human rights jeopardizes the
legal consolidation of human rights under the auspices of the ICC and the UN (a
consolidation Habermas strongly endorses). For in that case, philosophical arguments –
showing what human rights are about and explaining why they are important - could no
longer in principle justify the exclusion of a human right to subsistence from the
pantheon of legally enforceable human rights.
Here again, as a matter of related concern to proceduralists like Habermas and
Rawls, any conception of human rights based on a comprehensive moral conception of

basic human flourishing might appear to violate the pluralistic tenets of political
liberalism. In their opinion, such a teleological conception of human functioning would
not be universally convincing to all human beings. Hence, appealing to this standard of
human flourishing as a basis for legal action, critique and reform would amount to
imposing a particular, non-shareable ideal on the rest of the world.
At the risk of repeating myself once more, I find this to be a strange argument
from a philosopher who is convinced that cultures are conversationally open to one
another, disposed to rational cooperation by the very telos of language itself, and
therefore capable of converging toward – if not finally agreeing upon - universal
interests. As Martha Nussbaum notes in her critique of Habermas, if human rights can be
justified apart from their instrumental value for subjective legal freedom and democratic
autonomy, this is because they intuitively capture what we – in conversation with one
another – have taken to be needs and capabilities that are so integral to our understanding
of human flourishing that we insist upon securing their protection and development
through legal means. Put simply, Habermas has it exactly backwards. There is no reason
to expect that human beings would ever reach universal consensus on human rights
unless we assumed, as a regulative idea, that they already shared general interests
reflective of their human mode of existence; and there is no reason to expect that they
would ever reach this consensus impartially unless the discursive procedure on which it
was based was itself a rational reconstruction of substantive intuitions concerning
essential human functioning. 14 In that case, the UN's increasing reliance on a revisable
and cross-culturally negotiated list of capabilities in assessing progress in the
achievement of human rights demonstrates a healthy respect for moral realism that first-

generation critical theorists also shared, albeit not uncritically, and that Habermas would
be good to acknowledge as well.

Rights, Responsibilities, and Duties: Eliminating Poverty

I have argued that Habermas privileges a juridical conception of human rights that overemphasizes the decision-procedure requirements of a regime oriented toward resolving
disputes and processing claims. The result is that first-generation (liberal, civil, and
political) rights are privileged over second- and third-generation (social and cultural)
rights in such a way that only the former appear to be core human rights that come under
legal protection. This contradicts Habermas’s endorsement of the UDHR (and its
specification of a right to subsistence) as well as his own account of the complementarity
of moral rights, which human rights must also be, according to his own account of the
dialectic of morality and legality. Besides these theoretical inconsistencies in
Habermas’s thinking about human rights, there are practical deficiencies in regarding
human rights as exclusively juridical in nature. These deficiencies become apparent
when we examine the multiple institutional causes underlying poverty, some of which, as
I noted in the sweatshop example, are cultural.
I now want to address these practical deficiencies in greater detail. How does my
critique of Habermas’s juridical account of human rights affect our understanding of the
responsibilities and duties that accompany human rights? Suppose we accept the
standard assumption (contested by certain varieties of utilitarianism and other outcomeoriented approaches) that negative duties to refrain from causing harm have priority (all

things being equal) to positive duties to assist others in avoiding harm.15

What then is

our highest duty in fighting poverty?
I will argue that our highest duties are political, and involve the radical
transformation of social institutions that directly harm the desperately poor. In saying that
they are political – and involve positive action - by no means lessons their force, which is
negative and strong. Nor does it entail a specific priority in the kinds of political duties
we have. Who has what duty will depend on many factors. If I am correct in thinking that
cultural institutions contribute to harming the poor, then they too have a negative duty to
desist from harming themselves and others by continuing to perpetuate them.
Let me begin with the weakest – but most obvious – positive duty to provide aid
to the desperately poor, no matter the cause of their poverty. Thomas Pogge mentions
five facts that speak in favor of this duty: (1) the existence of widespread life-threatening
poverty; (2) the relatively large gap in quality of life expectations between those who
suffer this poverty and those who live in the developed world; (3) the impotence of the
desperately poor to change their condition on their own; (4) the pervasiveness of their
poverty in effecting all aspects of their lives, and (5) the relative ease with which those in
the developed world could substantially eliminate severe poverty without depriving
themselves of anything important (Pogge, p. 198).
Even if the desperately poor have unwittingly caused their suffering through bad
resource management, high birth rate due to their patriarchal culture, etc., we would still
have a weak duty to aid them, although if we had to choose between them and members
of our own community who are suffering the same it would not be unreasonable to favor
the latter. Morally speaking, an interactional account of human rights would say that the

desperately poor have a claim on each of us personally. Utilitarian theorists would add
that this claim is as strong as any other claim and that it requires transferring our own
resources to them up to the point at which their quality of life is roughly equivalent to our
own.
Utilitarian theory represents a maximalist - and for most people, counterintuitive
- view of our moral duties vis-à-vis protecting others’ right to subsistence.16
However that may be, facts (1)-(5) certainly provide the basis for a weaker positive duty
to mitigate, if not eliminate, severe poverty through individual acts of charitable giving
(this assumes, of course, that neo-Malthusian predictions regarding population growth do
not obtain once modest standards of secure subsistence are achieved). A stronger
negative duty can be generated if we accept three other conditions mentioned by Pogge:
(6) the existence of an institutional order that is shaped by the better-off and imposed on
the worst-off; (7) the causal contribution of this order to the radical inequality stipulated
in facts (1) – (5)17 and the existence of a feasible alternative institutional order that
significantly lessens this inequality;18 and (8) the absence of extra-social factors such as
natural disasters and genetic incapacities, in causing this inequality.
The addition of (6)-(8) takes us to the threshold of an institutional theory of
human rights; viz., the claims raised by the poor are directed against a harmful
institutional order that has been imposed on them by powerful governments. Although
this fact might be interpreted in interactional terms – as inculpating those of us who live
in the “imposer” countries – the fact of the matter is that these structures have an origin
that precedes what anyone alive today has done, deliberately or otherwise. This becomes
apparent when we consider two additional facts mentioned by Pogge: (9) “the better-off

enjoy significant advantages in the use of a single natural resource (oil) from whose
benefits the poor are largely, and without compensation, excluded”; and (10) the starting
positions of the worse-off and better-off have emerged from a history of social injustices.
Points (6) – (10) take us to the threshold of an institutional theory of human rights
of the sort that Pogge himself endorses but the language he uses to describe the workings
of these institutions is still interactional and juridical. For example, point (10) refers to a
past history of colonialism, slavery, and gun-boat imperialism – all actions that are today
condemned as violations of international law. Wealthy governments committed these
“crimes” with collusion of privileged accomplices within poor countries. This fact leads
Pogge to frame the negative duty to desist from causing harm into a positive duty on the
part of those who today continue to benefit from the crime - the descendents of those who
initially committed the crime - to compensate those who today continue to be harmed by
it – the descendents of those who initially suffered the crime. In other words, the duty to
establish a GRD is framed in terms of a juridical, liability model, which mandates
compensation in order to restore the plaintiff to a status quo ante.
Points (7) and (8) generate negative duties that appear to be targeted exclusively
to individual leaders and their appointed bureaucrats who assume direct responsibility for
negotiating and imposing unfair trade agreements, harmful borrowing conditions (that
require structural adjustments such as privatizing and downsizing services, devaluing
domestic currencies, etc.), forms of foreign assistance and developmental aid (that are
both woefully inadequate in meeting subsistence needs and go to pockets and projects
that do not benefit the desperately poor), and the like (see note 14). It is not difficult to

see how an interactive account of human rights might best explain their “liability” in
perpetrating a “monumental crime against these [poor] people.”19
But the question arises: How does the juridical model apply to us - average people
who are largely ill-informed about the arcane workings of international law and
economics? Are we liable for harming the very poor?
Perhaps we are complicit in harming the poor (by electing our government
leaders) and perhaps we have benefitted from current unjust institutions and the
cumulative advantages of past crimes and perhaps, too, we are complicit and have
benefited without our knowledge. Even “innocent” accomplices and beneficiaries of
injustice are duty-bound to cease in their harmful collusion (through education) and
compensate or restore what they have wrongfully taken.
However, as the sweatshop example illustrates, the causal sources of poverty may
reach farther than the legal and economic institutions cited by Pogge. They may implicate
the very structure of capitalism itself. In that case, it is far from certain whether a
juridical model of human rights involving policing (sanctioning) governments,
apprehending and punishing dictators who steal from and starve their own people, and
compensating victims for past harms will be adequate to eliminating radical inequality.20
Pogge’s reference to the cumulative (and by current attitudes, unintended)
harms descending from past acts of colonialism, slavery, and gun-boat imperialism may
well indict today’s capitalist system, which might not have come into being without the
primitive accumulation of capital generated by these acts. If we assume that capitalism
itself is a significant contributor to global poverty, then it makes no sense to blame

anyone for making it so. And yet there is a sense in which we – and perhaps even the
poor themselves – share responsibility for maintaining it.
Assuming the facts about global capitalism and sweatshop as I have presented
them, and replacing the legal model of liability with the moral model of social
connectedness, what responsibilities (duties) fall upon whom in upholding the right to
subsistence? We can begin by accepting Pogge’s assertion that we have a strong negative
duty to desist from imposing on the poor the sorts of institutional arrangements that harm
them. Furthermore, we now see that we may have an equally strong duty to change our
current economic system, whose ecologically destructive growth imperative endangers
everyone’s right to subsistence and not just the very poor’s. The emphasis is now
forward-looking and political.
Let’s begin small by focusing on eradicating sweatshops. Who bears what
responsibility in maintaining this system and what should they do to change it? Iris
Young mentions four parameters that can guide our thought in this area: power,
privilege, interest, and collective ability.21
Who exercises most power in maintaining this system? Certainly the large retail
stores who compete with one another and who insist that those wholesale and production
units with whom they contract receive no more than what the market demands. Because
they are unlikely to change their policies without public pressure, citizens have an
obligation to publicize their responsibility for upholding the system and to publicly
boycott and demonstrate against them should they refuse to pressure their production
units into raising wages and improving working conditions.

Of course, local leaders may contribute to maintaining exploitative working
conditions (thereby contributing to insecure subsistence) by outlawing unions or simply
refusing to enforce collective bargaining and worker-safety provisions. However, they are
often pressured to do so by multinationals and international lending institutions which
impose regulation-free zones and the like. Ultimately, all of these – from the most
powerful multinationals to the smallest sub-contractual unit of production – work under
pressure from global market forces to lower costs of production (including and especially
wages). Hence citizens (perhaps through their membership in NGOs) must lobby their
governments to enforce collective bargaining laws both inside and outside their own
borders.22
Who is privileged within the system? Certainly the stockholders who own shares
in these retail stores, for they profit the most. However, relatively affluent consumers in
the developing world who purchase goods that are made cheap at the expense of those
who make them also benefit from the system. Since they can afford to pay more for these
goods without experiencing any hardship at all, they should be among the leaders of
those demonstrating for change.
Who is most capable of collectively organizing against the system? Not all
persons are equally positioned to engage in organized political action. College students
are an exception because they are well educated and well informed, generally don’t have
to work full time or raise families, and provide a steady source of revenue to universities
and colleges, who are among the biggest purchasers of sweatshop-made apparel. On the
other end of the spectrum, those who work in sweatshops are often among the least

capable of organizing themselves, especially when doing so is likely to be met with
violent resistance on the part of company and police enforcement agencies.
Finally, who has the most to gain from changing the system? Those who should
be most interested in changing the system are, of course, sweatshop workers themselves.
On the social connectedness model, they too bear some responsibility in maintaining the
system to the extent that they are able to organize themselves into unions. But suppose
we are dealing with domestic sweatshops under the supervision of a patriarchal subcontractor? Here unionization seems out of the question.
In order for the women and children who work in these sweatshops to organize
themselves they must not only liberate themselves from oppressive legal and economic
institutions; they must liberate themselves from oppressive cultural institutions, among
the most oppressive being gender roles and caste distinctions The case of India is
especially instructive in this regard. India has passed the equivalent of an Equal Rights
Amendment for women and has officially outlawed caste discrimination (while providing
affirmative action preferences for scheduled castes that have accumulated centuries of
disadvantages). However, the civil code is not uniform. Alongside a secular code there
exist separate religious codes for persons who are classified as Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, or
Christian. Persons are enrolled in these religious classifications at birth and can exit them
only with difficulty. Importantly, these codes, which govern marriage, divorce,
inheritance, and support, have placed barriers women’s economic equality and have
contributed to the impoverishment of women as a group.23
Over the years these religious civil codes have been amended by the Indian
Parliament and the higher court to allow women more rights in some instances and not in

others. Clearly, there is a limit to what the law can accomplish in this area, but it is
important not to exaggerate this limit. It is not conceptual. The family is itself an artificial
construct of the law. Government regulation of the family is necessary to prevent the
worst abuses suffered by women and children: rape, exploitation, forced domestic
confinement, slavery, and prostitution, to mention some of the worst violations. This
regulation is all the more imperative in light of the family’s critical role in nurturing the
basic capabilities that are the proper content of human rights protection.
However, legal regulation has its limits. As a product of custom, the family is not
exclusively a legal institution. This explains why the state encounters so much resistance
when it intervenes within family life. As an institution that stands partly outside legal
and economic systems, it conforms to a different logic: that of a more or less voluntary
association based on mutual recognition, or what Habermas calls communicative
reciprocity. Arguments in support of the family as an institution that properly belongs
within the “private” sphere partly play upon the ideal of family solidarity based upon
open and undistorted communication between its constituent members. These arguments
provide a prima facie warrant for subjecting any legal interference into the family to the
highest scrutiny. However, the state’s burden of proof in regulating the family is not hard
to meet, for traditional patriarchal family is anything but a consensual relationship based
on open and undistorted communication.24
Here we have what is perhaps the most direct application of DT in the area of
human rights enforcement. The most visible forms of familial domination are personal
and interactional, often involving physical and psychological coercion. The less visible
cultural background that legitimates this domination, however, is institutional, rooted in

shared expectations about child-bearing, child-rearing, and the distribution of spousal
roles (care-giver, bread earner, household laborer, household manager, money-manager,
etc.). Often it is religion or conventional custom that determines these roles, which can be
very detrimental to the well-being of women and children, who are denied economic
control over their lives and are accordingly condemned to a life of dependency,
vulnerability, and passivity.
In cases where fulfilling these roles effectively diminishes secure access to basic
goods necessary for subsistence – or, for that matter, the satisfaction of basic needs no
matter their source – we may speak of a human rights abuse. Here the claimant in
question is seldom in a position to press her claim (and may not even recognize it, due to
her adaptive preference for maintaining the status quo). Even if she could, it would be
unclear to whom she would press it. But an institutional account of human rights can
remedy this problem: it is the religious or conventional institution in which these roles are
imposed (through the sheer weight of traditional authority) that stands indicted.
In cases where law is not the most effective way to change custom, another –
pedagogical – form of political practice is required. Women must come to see themselves
and their relationship to their religion and community differently. Because the needs for
community and religion (or an equivalent source for meaning, purpose, and identity) are
basic needs as well as capabilities that can be more or less developed, simple
emancipation from tradition is unrealistic. Instead, political pedagogy must be aimed at
showing – in a manner that is respectful of women’s cultural identities – that women can
become economically self-reliant, or acquire roles that provide them with more secure
access to subsistence and therewith provide them with greater equality from within their

inherited (or otherwise preferred) cultural identities. This is one measure that must be
undertaken at the micro-level, in the domestic sweatshop industry where all too often
traditional gender roles conspire to victimize women, who are under rule and thumb of
their husbands (who, of course, are also victimized in turn by those who sub-contract
their labor).
To conclude, DT has application in reasoning about human rights and our
corresponding duties regardless of what parameter of responsibility we choose, but this
only becomes apparent once we understand that the problem of human rights abuse – and
not just the problem of human rights definition - is political (forward-looking) and not
merely juridical (backward-looking). Privileging liberal and political rights (as
Habermas’s juridical derivation of rights does) obscures this fact because it cedes
responsibility for defining (legislating), adjudicating, and enforcing human rights to
formal legal institutions. No matter how political these institutions may be, their formal
discourse is always oriented toward decision grounded in a pre-existing legal
authoritative: the constitution (or a court-centered proxy). Only when we examine social
and cultural human rights do we see that the definition and enforcement of human rights
is fundamentally political and forward-looking, a philosophical matter of dialogically
clarifying who we as persons and as individuals are.
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diminution of opportunities. While those who work in sweatshops may indeed receive subsistence (and
even above subsistence) wages, their access to subsistence is dependent on those who have absolute power
over them – their bosses – and is therefore insecure. Moreover, because subsistence itself is relative to
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Nussbaum argues that Rawls’s ambiguous treatment of the family – as at once a part of the “basic
structure” of society that requires legal regulation and as a quasi-private association that is at best
“indirectly” effected by the law presumes that the family is entirely a legal construct. In India, where family
law is partly defined by religious custom, this makes some sense. However, even here – not to mention in
more secular contexts – there remains a “consensual” aspect of the family that properly falls within the
private sphere and which, therefore, is not (and perhaps ought not to be) directly regulated. Private
religious institutions, for instance, may well practice forms of gender, racial, and sexual orientation
discrimination that are rightly outlawed in the public sphere but which cannot (and ought not) be legally
outlawed within these institutional settings, so long as membership within them is consensual and exit
options are available (a condition that may not always be met in some practices, such as those of
fundamentalist Mormons, who recruit wives into polygamous marriages at a very early age and closely
monitor their behavior). That said, these forms of discriminatory relationships may still impede the full
enjoyment of human rights by some who have consented to them. While legal intervention may be
appropriate remedies for counteracting the coercive pressuring of under-age women into exploitative
relationships of dependency and abuse, it may not be in others. Nussbaum herself recognizes that some
consensual arrangements that adversely impact the full enjoyment of human rights, such as purdah (the
seclusion of women from public view practiced by some Muslims), may at best be regulated to prevent the
worst abuses while less severe abuses will have to be counteracted through education and consciousnessraising (Women and Human Development, 237 ff).
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